Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2003

Uintah Basin Medical Center v. Leo W. Hardy, M.D.
: Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Blaine J. Benard, E. Blaine Rawson; Holme, Roberts & Owen; attorneys for appellee.
John P. Harrington, Jennifer L. Lange; Holland & Hart; attorneys for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Uintah Basin Medical Center v. Hardy, No. 20030632 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2003).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4494

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT,
LEO W. HARDY, M.D.

LEO W. HARDY, M.I).,
Defendant/Appellant,

CV.

\

: <•(>"-<

v

LEO W. HARDY, M.D.,
Counterclaimant and
Third-Party Plaintiff,
V.

UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER iiml
THOMAS J. ALLRED, M.D.,
Counterclaim Defendants
and Third-Party Defendants.
From Final Judgment and an Order of Post-Remand Summary Judgment
of the Eighth Judicial District Court for Duchesne County, State of Utah
Honorable John R. Anderson, Presiding

Blaine J. Benard (A5661)
E. Blaine Rawson (A7289)
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN, LLP
299 South Main, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-5800
Facsimile: (801)521-9639
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee
Uintah Basin Medical Center

John P. Harrington (A5242)
Jennifer L. Lange (A8470)
HOLLAND & HART LLP
60 East South Temple, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 595-7800
Facsimile: (801) 364-9124
Attorneys for Defendant/Appc ... \
Leo W. Hardy, M.D.
FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

MAY 2 6 2004

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

INTRODUCTION

1

ARGUMENT

3

I.

UBMC AND THE TRIAL COURT COMPLETELY IGNORE THE SUMMARY
JUDGMENT STANDARD AND DISCOUNT THE EVIDENCE PROFFERED
BY DR. HARDY
A.
B.

The Trial Court Infringed on the Jury's Duty by Weighing the Evidence
and Determining Reasonableness of Duration

3

Dr. Hardy Offered Substantial Evidence, Even Without Further
Development of the Record as Recommended by the Supreme Court,
Sufficient to Create a Genuine Issue of Material Fact Enabling Him to
Survive Summary Judgment

5

1.

Other Contracts Identical to Dr. Hardy's

6

2.

UBMC's own Bylaws Support the Reasonableness of Dr. Hardy's
Agreement

7

Dr. Hardy's Declaration does not Contradict His Deposition
Testimony

8

3.
4.
II.

III.

3

Dr. Hardy has Presented Sufficient Admissible Extrinsic Evidence
Proving that there is a Genuine Dispute of Material Fact

11

THE SUPREME COURT'S DIRECTIVE TO THE TRIAL COURT TO
DEVELOP THE RECORD CLEARLY CONTEMPLATES CONDUCTING
ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY

12

PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY AND FAIRNESS DICTATE THAT UBMC MUST
BE REQUIRED TO HONOR ITS CONTRACTS

14

CONCLUSION

15

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
Anderson Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986)

2

STATE CASES
Cantu v. Peacher, 53 S.W.3d 5 (Tex. App. 2001)

..9,10

Mountain States Tele. & Tele. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258
(Utah 1984)

1

Salt Lake City,XK MUX

17

Trujillo v. Utah Department of Transport, 1999 UT App. 227, 986 P.2d 752
Uintah Basin Medical Ctr. v. Hardy, 2002 UT 92, 54 P.3d 1165, remanded

11
1, 3, 7,10

Wardv. Intermountain Farmers Associate, 907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995)

11

Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983)

9

INTRODUCTION
The Uintah Basin Medical Center ("UBMC") raises several legal arguments in its
opposing brief that require response. Most importantly, however, UBMC completely
ignores the standard for summary judgment. That is, a judge is charged with reviewing
the evidence presented, construing that evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, and determining whether reasonable minds could differ as to the
evidence and inferences drawn therefrom.1 The trial court erred in not construing the
facts available to it in the light most favorable to Leo W. Hardy M.D. ("Dr. Hardy").
UBMC also repeatedly suggests that Dr. Hardy moved to re-open discovery when in fact,
the Utah Supreme Court, in Uintah Basin Med. Ctr. v. Hardy, 2002 UT 92, Tf 18, 54 P.3d
1165 ("Uintah Basin 7"), remanded the case back to the trial court instructing the trial
court to "develop the record." Dr. Hardy presented ample evidence, even without
developing the record, to create a genuine issue of material fact upon which reasonable
minds could differ and, therefore, the trial court's grant of summary judgment should be
reversed.
The trial court was asked to make a threshold determination of whether the "just
cause" provision of Dr. Hardy's agreement with UBMC (the "Agreement") created an
unreasonable time duration. To that end, the trial court was directed to analyze whether a
reasonable person could interpret the pertinent facts in such a way that made the
durational element of Dr. Hardy's Agreement (i.e., the occurrence of "just cause") appear

1

See Mountain States Tele. & Tele. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d
1258, 1261 (Utah 1984).

reasonable. If there were sufficient facts that might lead a person to find the contract
reasonable, then the trial court's job was done and it was compelled to deny the motion
for summary judgment and give the case to the jury. There is no weighing or assessing
the facts—the facts as presented by Dr. Hardy are accepted as true. If there was no
possible way that a person could interpret the durational element as reasonable, then the
trial court was obligated to grant the summary judgment. Here, the trial court's
assessments of Dr. Hardy's evidence went well beyond the scope of the assignment given
to the trial court in the context of a summary judgment. In order to survive summary
judgment, Dr. Hardy "need only present evidence from which a jury might return a
verdict in his favor. If he does so, there is a genuine issue of fact that requires a trial."
Anderson Liberty Lobby, Inc., Ml U.S. 242, 257 (1986)(emphasis added). Dr. Hardy
meets and exceeds that standard.
The trial court misinterpreted the instructions of the Utah Supreme Court and
mistakenly thought that the appellate court was asking the trial court to do something
more than just the threshold inquiry that is required in a summary judgment setting.
UBMC argues that the trial court followed the Supreme Court's mandate. Not only did
the trial court not follow the Supreme Court's mandate, but it construed crucial evidence
presented by Dr. Hardy against him in complete contradiction of the well-settled
summary judgment standard. The trial court's grant of summary judgment should be
reversed and the case remanded for additional discovery and trial pursuant to the Utah
Supreme Court's direction in Uintah Basin L

ARGUMENT
I.

UBMC AND THE TRIAL COURT COMPLETELY IGNORE THE
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD AND DISCOUNT THE EVIDENCE
PROFFERED BY DR. HARDY.
A.

The Trial Court Infringed on the Jury's Duty by Weighing the
Evidence and Determining Reasonableness of Duration.

The Supreme Court's instructions on remand to the trial court in Uintah Basin 1
contemplate mixed questions of law and fact. The trial court has power to make the legal
determinations, but must, at the summary judgment stage, construe all facts alleged by
Dr. Hardy as true and determine only whether there are sufficient facts such that
reasonable minds could differ as to the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom. The
Supreme Court suggests certain facts that might be useful to the trial court in its
determination of what facts a jury might consider to determine reasonableness of Dr.
Hardy's Agreement with UBMC, but does not and cannot take away Dr. Hardy's right to
have a jury determine the questions of fact in this case.
For example, the Supreme Court states that "if the 'just cause' provision gives
successor boards broad discretion to terminate Dr. Hardy [ ], the contract is more likely to
be of a reasonable duration than if the 'just cause' provision permitted termination only
for deficient job performance." Uintah Basin, 2002 UT 92 at Tf 18. The Supreme Court
went on to suggest what evidence might be useful in determining the reasonableness of
duration such as "comparing] Dr. Hardy's contract to the agreements UBMC typically
enters into with medical professionals." Id, Dr. Hardy provided the trial court with two
contracts that have similar or identical termination clauses as Dr. Hardy's, and the trial

court exceeded its authority by classifying Dr. Hardy's Agreement and the other two he
presented as "unusual" and "dissimilar."2 The trial court was not charged with
categorizing the contracts UBMC has entered into with its medical professionals, but
only to view the contracts presented in a light most favorable to Dr. Hardy to determine
whether there is a genuine issue of fact regarding UBMC's past contract practices with its
medical professionals. The mere fact that the trial court categorized certain contracts as
"typical" and others as "atypical" indicates that the trial court engaged in impermissible
fact finding that is reserved for the jury.
Even if the trial court did have the power to classify the contracts as "typical" or
"atypical," the trial court completely ignored the fact that there are two types of doctors
working at UBMC: (1) doctors with private practices; and (2) hospital-based physicians
who rely on other doctors for their work. Dr. Hardy is a hospital-based physician and he
relies on other doctors to send pathology work his way. He does not see patients on his
own. The distinction between private practice physicians and hospital-based doctors is
important because none of the contracts UBMC has entered into in the past with its
hospital-based physicians contain a duration. Thus, contrary to the trial court's
classification of Dr. Hardy's Agreement as "unusual" or "dissimilar/' the evidence
clearly indicates that his Agreement is typical for hospital-based physicians. The trial
court erred by weighing these contracts and making the factual determination that these

2

See Addendum "C" attached to Appellant's Brief. The trial court also classified Dr.
Wayne T. Stewart's ("Dr. Stewart") contract as "atypical."
3

Drs. Stewart and Joseph J. Sannella ("Dr. Sannella") are hospital-based physicians.

contracts and the circumstances surrounding them do not represent contracts UBMC
"typically enters into with medical professionals." What the trial court should have done
is accept those contracts proffered by Dr. Hardy and determine whether reasonable minds
could differ on the issue of whether they are representative of UBMC s past contractual
practices.
UBMC contends that the trial court was not "required to determine whether there
is any possible way—reasonable or not—to support Dr. Hardy's case." Dr. Hardy does
not expect the trial court to ferret out evidence to support his case which is why he
marshaled the evidence, expecting the trial court to fulfill its duty to view that evidence in
the light most favorable to him as the non-moving party. Dr. Hardy is well aware of his
burden to produce evidence, but he is also aware of the trial court's duty not to exceed its
authority on summary judgment. Because the trial court exceeded its authority, this
Court should reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment.
B.

Dr. Hardy Offered Substantial Evidence, Even Without Further
Development of the Record as Recommended by the Supreme Court
Sufficient to Create a Genuine Issue of Material Fact Enabling Him to
Survive Summary Judgment.

Dr. Hardy's pleadings are replete with facts proving that his Agreement with
UBMC was reasonable in light of the circumstances of his practice and the rural nature of
the hospital and community. At the very least, reasonable minds could differ on the
interpretation of the facts regarding the reasonableness of the Agreement's duration and
"just cause" issues. The evidence supporting the facts is found in other contracts
identical to Dr. Hardy's and UBMC's own Bylaws. Further, Dr. Hardy submitted a

declaration in an effort to develop the record as instructed by the Supreme Court,
explaining his own interpretation of "just cause" although the scope of the "just cause"
provision relates to UBMC's understanding of its own rights and powers to terminate a
physician, not Dr. Hardy's understanding of the term. UBMC wants to pick and choose
the facts in this case and present its handpicked facts to the trial court for determination.
The case law is clear: juries determine reasonableness, weigh facts, and make credibility
determinations. UBMC's prior contracts, its own Bylaws, Dr. Hardy's declaration, and
the extrinsic evidence presented by Dr. Hardy, are sufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact.
1*

Other Contracts Identical to Dr. Hardy's.

Dr. Hardy provided the trial court with two contracts that are almost identical to
his own Agreement with respect to the termination language, neither of which includes a
duration.4 The trial court erred when it made a determination that Dr. Hardy's
Agreement was unreasonable when compared to contracts UBMC entered into with other
physicians. The trial court cannot make a determination as to the significance of Drs.
Sannella's and Stewart's contracts vis a vis Dr. Hardy's Agreement. At this stage, the
Court should simply have reviewed the contracts presented to it and determined whether
reasonable minds could differ on the issue of whether three (3) out of the thirteen (13)
contracts produced by UBMC which are similarly situated to Dr. Hardy's, if not identical,
are sufficient to be considered contracts UBMC typically enters into with its medical
4

Drs. Stewart and Sannella's contracts are attached to Appellant's Brief already on file
with the Court as Addendums "E" and "G".

professionals.

Significantly, the three contracts presented by Dr. Hardy represent 23%

of the contracts presented to the trial court. Even on a statistical basis, the contracts
presented that are identical to Dr. Hardy's Agreement are not atypical. That said, the trial
court never should have assigned a weight to these contracts or made a determination of
their typicality as that exercise far exceeded the trial court's authority.
2.

UBMC's own Bylaws Support the Reasonableness of Dr.
Hardy's Agreement.

The Supreme Court noted in Uintah Basin 1 that UBMC's Bylaws "suggest that
UBMC routinely enters into agreements under which the only practical durational limit is
a liberally-construed 'just cause' provision." Uintah Basin, 2002 UT 92 at \ 18, note 4.
In its brief, UBMC argues that "this provision of the Bylaws specifically governs
UBMC's procedures for granting hospital privileges to medical professionals; it is not
applicable to contracting for services or employment with such professionals."
Appellee's Br. at 20. This statement flies in the face of UBMC's hiring practices in that
granting medical privileges to physicians is the basis upon which doctors are employed at
UBMC. Why would UBMC ever employ a doctor without granting medical privileges?
Granting privileges and employing doctors are inextricably connected regardless of
UBMC's attempt to distance itself from its own Bylaws which have a "liberallyconstrued 'just cause' provision." The Bylaws are clearly applicable to UBMC's
contracting practices because they necessarily apply to employment of medical

5

UBMC alleges that it has produced all of the contracts in its possession that it has with
its medical professionals which numbers thirteen contracts. See Brief of Appellee
(hereinafter "Appellee's Br.") at p. 4 and p. 22, note 11.

professionals, and they affirm UBMC's history of entering into "agreements under which
the only practical durational limit is a liberally-construed 'just cause' provision" as noted
by the Supreme Court.6 This history is relevant in determining the reasonableness of
duration of Dr. Hardy's contract.
The trial court ignored the Bylaws, which are evidence of agreements or contracts
wherein UBMC has utilized a broad "just cause" provision for termination. The Bylaws,
on their own, are sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact on which reasonable minds can
differ regarding UBMC's propensity to include liberally-construed "just cause"
provisions in its contracts with its medical professionals and, therefore, the trial court's
grant of summary judgment should be reversed.
3.

Dr. Hardy's Declaration does not Contradict His Deposition
Testimony.

Both the trial court and UBMC make much of Dr. Hardy's declaration which
details his understanding of the meaning of "just cause."7 The trial court erred in making
a credibility determination at the summary judgment stage. Dr. Hardy's declaration was
submitted simply to expand on his understanding of the meaning of "just cause" in
response to the Supreme Court's directive to outline the instances where the contract
might be terminated, and it in no way contradicts his deposition testimony. Nowhere in
his declaration does Dr. Hardy attempt to refute or contradict his deposition testimony;
6

Dr. Hardy believes that the medical staff portion of the Bylaws are sufficiently
ambiguous to suggest that they do, in fact, govern employment as well as the grant of
hospital privileges to medical professionals.
7

The trial court's derogatory comments about Dr. Hardy's declaration are telling
evidence of the trial court's disdain for this case and Dr. Hardy.

rather he addressed a question that was not asked of him at his deposition, but has been
asked by the Supreme Court: are there circumstances, other than Dr. Hardy's
professional performance, that would permit UBMC to terminate Dr. Hardy's
Agreement? The answer was and still is yes. Interestingly, Dr. Hardy is the only party
who has responded to the Supreme Court's instruction to develop the record on the intent
of the parties when they entered into the Agreement. UBMC's response to the Supreme
Court's directive is to fight additional discovery at every turn.
Dr. Hardy agrees with UBMC that the language in Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170
(Utah 1983) is very clear. The Court held that "when a party takes a clear position in a
deposition, that is not modified on cross-examination, he may not thereafter raise an issue
of fact by his own affidavit which contradicts his deposition..." Id. at 1172-73
(emphasis added).8 In Webster's Dictionary, "contradict" is defined as "1: to assert the
contrary of: take issue with, 2: to imply the opposite or a denial of."9 Dr. Hardy's
declaration does not take issue with or imply the opposite of his deposition testimony.
Dr. Hardy was asked during his deposition what he thought "just cause" meant. He gave
an honest answer which he stands by today. Contrary to UBMC's allegation that Dr.
Hardy attempts to "distance himself from the views expressed at his deposition and
8

Regarding differences between affidavit and deposition testimony, a Texas Court held
that "[i]f the differences fall into the category of variations on a theme, consistent in the
major allegations but with some variances of detail, this is grounds for impeachment, and
not a vitiation of the later filed document." Cantu v. Peacher, 53 S.W.3d 5, 10 (Tex.
App. 2001). Further, the Court went on to state that "[m]ost differences between a
witness's affidavit and deposition are more a matter of degree and details than direct
contradiction. This reflects human inaccuracy more than fraud." Id.
9

WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY

284 (9th ed. 1990).

throughout the course of this litigation" (Appellee's Br. at p. 17), and that he "seeks
permission to fundamentally change his theory of the case by submitting a contrived,
post-hoc declaration" (Id. at 3), Dr. Hardy's argument that the scope of the "just cause"
provision relates to UBMC's understanding of its own rights and powers to terminate a
physician and not Dr. Hardy's understanding of the term simply tracks the Supreme
Court's determination that the scope of the "just cause" provision "depends in large part
on the amount of discretion [the] provision gives to successor boards." Uintah Basin,
2002 UT 92 at ^f 18, The trial court clearly misapplied Uintah Basin 1 and stated that
"[gjiven Dr. Hardy's understanding of the intended scope of the just cause clause in light
of the Utah Supreme Court's opinion, the contract offered little discretion to successor
boards." (R. 1625). The Utah Supreme Court did not determine that the "just cause"
provision in Dr. Hardy's Agreement is narrow. In fact, the Court held just the opposite,
stating that under UBMC's Bylaws, "'just cause' appears to have a broad scope: for
instance, the board may terminate a member of the medical staff for any reason
'reasonably related to the delivery of quality patient care.'" Uintah Basin, 2002 UT 92 at
K 18, note 4. It is clear that it makes no difference what Dr. Hardy understands "just
cause" to mean. The scope of the clause applies to UBMC's power and/or understanding
of its power. What is important, is UBMC's Board of Trustees' intent in contracting with
Dr. Hardy as to those circumstances under which UBMC might terminate Dr. Hardy's
Agreement, which is something from which UBMC wishes to distance itself knowing full
well its intent upon Dr. Hardy's hiring. The focus, therefore, should be on UBMC, not
on what Dr. Hardy thought were instances where he could be terminated.

Regardless of whether the declaration is relevant, the trial court erred yet again
when it determined that Dr. Hardy's declaration could not be relied upon. It is not proper
at the summary judgment stage for the trial court to assess the credibility or reliability of
Dr. Hardy's declaration as compared to his deposition testimony.10
4.

Dr. Hardy has Presented Sufficient Admissible Extrinsic
Evidence Proving that there is a Genuine Dispute of Material
Fact.

The Supreme Court noted the importance of UBMC's past contractual practices
with its physicians. This is extrinsic evidence as it does not appear on the face of the
contract. This and other evidence relevant to the reasonableness determination is
necessary for a fair interpretation of Dr. Hardy's Agreement. Further, extrinsic evidence
is used to prove intent as set forth in Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Assoc, 907 P.2d
264 (Utah 1995). In addition, extrinsic evidence is admissible "if the meaning of the
contract is ambiguous or uncertain." Id. at 268. The Utah Supreme Court has directed
that the reasonableness of the duration of Dr. Hardy's Agreement be determined. The
trier of fact, a jury in this case, must make this determination after hearing evidence
regarding the parties' intent and deciding whether Drs. Stewart and Sannella's contracts
are sufficient evidence of the types of contracts UBMC enters into with medical
professionals.

See Trujillo v. Utah Dep 't o/Transp., 1999 UT App. 227,142, 986 P.2d 752.

II.

THE SUPREME COURT'S DIRECTIVE TO THE TRIAL COURT TO
DEVELOP THE RECORD CLEARLY CONTEMPLATES CONDUCTING
ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY.
UBMC argues in its brief that Dr. Hardy did not properly seek additional

discovery and that he should have filed an affidavit pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure if he wanted to conduct additional discovery. See Appellee's
Br. at 21. UBMC ignores the fact that it is the Supreme Court that remanded the case
directing the trial court to develop the record. That mandate clearly contemplates
additional discovery. The Court directed a review of other contracts UBMC has entered
into with other medical professionals. Dr. Stewart was one of the doctors with whom
UBMC had a contract which did not have a durational limit. When Dr. Hardy attempted
to question Dr. Stewart about his contract with UBMC during Dr. Stewart's deposition,
Dr. Stewart's attorney instructed him not to answer. Dr. Hardy intended to continue this
line of questioning at trial as Dr. Stewart was listed as a witness on both Dr. Hardy and
UBMC's witness lists.11 Dr. Hardy is vitally interested in finding out why UBMC
entered into contracts similar to his, without durations, with Drs. Sannella and Stewart.
Regarding Dr. Stewart's contract, why did UBMC continue to honor a contract devoid of
a durational limit, like Dr. Stewart's, when the hospital was arguing in this litigation that
such a contract was unreasonable?
Further, UBMC refused in the past to provide other UBMC contracts which were
requested by Dr. Hardy. In fact, UBMC has stated that it has "negotiated a few contracts,
11

Dr. Hardy wras not required to re-depose Dr. Stewart. He intended to call Dr. Stewart
as a witness at trial which he has every right to do. The reason Dr. Hardy does not have
all of the information he needs from Dr. Stewart is the fault of UBMC, not Dr. Hardy.

primarily in the 1980's, that had indefinite durations to entice doctors to work at UBMC."
(R. 1415). This admission confirms that UBMC did, in fact, typically enter into contracts
with indefinite durations when circumstances called for it. It makes no difference when
UBMC entered those contracts, only that it did. Similarly, a jury could easily determine
that it makes no difference how many contracts exist that are devoid of durational limits,
only that they do, in fact exist. This statement is also evidence of UBMC's intent in
entering into indefinite duration contracts, supporting Dr. Hardy's contention that
UBMC's offering him an indefinite duration was a bargaining chip thrown to him to
persuade him to work for UBMC.
It is true that discovery has closed and this case has been certified as ready for
trial, but that was before the Supreme Court held that the types of contracts UBMC has
entered into in the past are relevant which lead to the Court's direction to the trial court to
develop the record. Dr. Hardy should be allowed to conduct additional discovery on this
issue so that he can present evidence to the trial court and "develop the record" as
directed by the Supreme Court. Further, Dr. Hardy may in fact wish to retain an expert
witness to testify about "typical" contracts used by rural hospitals. In light of the
Supreme Court's mandate, re-opening discovery and allowing an additional expert
witness are not unreasonable requests. Further, this Court should consider what UBMC's
unwillingness to follow the Supreme Court's directive to develop the record and re-open
discovery means. UBMC has thwarted Dr. Hardy's attempts at discovery in the past
when it instructed Dr. Stewart not to answer important questions about his contract. Now
UBMC is fighting the re-opening of discovery to determine UBMC's past contractual

practices. UBMC is clearly hiding something and this Court should require a full
exposition of the facts, especially those requested by the Utah Supreme Court.
While UBMC's cited case law on this issue is well placed, it is not relevant to this
matter because in the cases cited, a higher court had not directed further development of
the record. UBMC argues that when the Supreme Court directed development of the
record, it simply meant that the parties should submit additional evidence already gained
through discovery to the trial court. There is no evidence in the Uintah Basin 1 decision
to support this interpretation of the Court's mandate.
III.

PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY AND FAIRNESS DICTATE THAT UBMC
MUST BE REQUIRED TO HONOR ITS CONTRACTS.
UBMC states that it determined sometime during the summer of 1996 that it

needed afiill-timepathologist. See Appellee's Br. at 7. Interestingly, no one from
UBMC ever approached Dr. Hardy and asked him if he would be willing to become
UBMC's full-time pathologist. UBMC terminated Dr. Hardy because it believed that it
could get a better deal out of Dr. Thomas J. Allred ("Dr. Allred") who also practiced
emergency medicine. To say that Dr. Hardy was shocked and offended by his dismissal
after providing excellent service at UBMC is an understatement. Dr. Hardy negotiated
the "just cause" provision to offset the professional risk and personal sacrifice he made
by moving to rural Utah to practice medicine. He counted on UBMC keeping its word
and living up to the Agreement they signed. Now, under the guise of restricting the
freedom of future boards, UBMC asks this Court to condone its breach of the Agreement.

This Court should not pardon UBMC's complete lack of respect for a written
agreement when, by its own admission, UBMC "negotiated a few contracts,..., that had
indefinite durations to entice doctors to work at UBMC." (R. 1415). This is exactly what
UBMC did with Dr. Hardy, it signed an agreement with an indefinite duration to entice
Dr. Hardy to work at UBMC, and now UBMC wants to back out of that Agreement.
Allowing UBMC to breach this Agreement sends the message that written agreements are
worthless.
Finally, the trial court's treatment of Dr. Hardy, which includes derogatory
statements and a complete abuse of discretion on summary judgment, is evidence that the
trial court will do anything it can to get rid of this case instead of fulfilling its duty to
apply the law and give Dr. Hardy his day in court.
CONCLUSION
The trial court abdicated its duty in the summary judgment proceedings by not
construing the evidence presented to it in the light most favorable to Dr. Hardy as the
non-moving party. Both UBMC and the trial court completely ignore the summary
judgment standard and discount every piece of evidence proffered by Dr. Hardy. Further,
the trial court infringed on the jury's role in this matter which is to determine whether the
duration of Dr. Hardy's Agreement is reasonable. Dr Hardy offered substantial evidence,
such as other contracts identical to Dr. Hardy's, UBMC's own Bylaws, Dr. Hardy's
declaration, and extrinsic evidence, even without further development of the record as
directed by the Supreme Court, sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact
enabling him to survive summary judgment. However, the Supreme Court's directive to

the trial court to develop the record clearly contemplates conducting additional discovery
and this Court should re-open discovery. Finally, principles of equity and fairness dictate
that UBMC must be required to honor this and its other indefinite duration contracts. The
history of this case shows that the trial court has done everything in its power to rid itself
of Dr. Hardy and his case, this is not fair. For these and all other foregoing reasons, the
trial court's grant of summary judgment should be reversed and this case should be
remanded to the trial court with the directive to re-open discovery if only for the limited
purpose of determining UBMC's past contractual practices and the typicality of
outstanding and past contracts with medical professionals.
DATED this ^

day of May 2004.
HOLLAND & HART LLP

JWul P. Hanffigton
lifer L. Lange
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
Leo W. Hardy, M.D.
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